Abstract. We propose a practical public-key encryption scheme whose security against chosen-ciphertext attacks can be reduced in the standard model to the assumption that factoring is intractable.
Introduction
The security of almost any cryptographic primitive (such as public-key encryption or digital signatures) has to rely on the computational hardness of a certain number-theoretic problem. Unfortunately, since there are currently no tools available to rigorously prove lower bounds on the complexity of such problems, one has to base security on (unproven) cryptographic hardness assumptions. The only confidence we have in such assumptions is that after a sufficiently large period of time, nobody could successfully refute them. The most established cryptographic hardness assumption is without doubt the so called factoring assumption which states that, given the product of two distinct large primes, it is computationally infeasible to reconstruct the primes. Despite of intensive research, no algorithm has been found that can efficiently factor composite numbers.
Main result. In this paper we propose a new public-key encryption scheme that is based on Rabin's trapdoor one-way permutation [35] . We can prove that the security of our scheme against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA security) is equivalent to the factoring assumption. Furthermore, the scheme is practical as its encryption performs only roughly two, and its decryption roughly one modular exponentiation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first scheme that simultaneously enjoys those two properties.
History. The notion of CCA security is due to Rackoff and Simon [36] and is now widely accepted as the standard security notion for public-key encryption schemes. In contrast to security against passive adversaries (security against chosen-plaintext attacks aka semantic security), in a chosen-ciphertext attack the adversary plays an active role by obtaining the decryptions of ciphertexts (or even arbitrary bit-strings) of his choosing. The practical significance of such attacks was demonstrated by Bleichenbacher [4] by means of a CCA attack against schemes following the encryption standard PKCS #1.
Historically, the first scheme that was provably secure against CCA attacks is due to Dolev, Dwork, and Naor [17] (building on an earlier result by Naor and Yung [31] ). Their generic construction is based on enhanced trapdoor permutations and therefore (using the enhanced trapdoor permutations from [20, App. C]) yields a scheme CCA secure under the factoring assumption. However, in practice these schemes are prohibitively impractical, as they rely on expensive non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. The first practical schemes provably CCA secure under standard cryptographic hardness assumptions were due to Cramer and Shoup [15, 14] . However, their framework of "hash proof systems" inherently relies on decisional assumptions such as the assumed hardness of deciding if a given integer has a square root modulo a composite number with unknown factorization (DQR assumption), or of deciding if a given tuple is a Diffie-Hellman tuple or not (DDH assumption). Until today, Cramer and Shoup's framework of hash proof systems (with its variations from [29, 19, 11, 28, 24, 27] ) and the recent concept of lossy trapdoor functions [33] yield the only known CCA secure practical encryption schemes based on an assumption related to factoring: the DQR assumption and Paillier's decisional composite residuosity (DCR) assumption. Currently, no practical scheme is known that is CCA secure solely under the factoring assumption (or even under the potentially stronger RSA assumption).
In general, decisional assumptions are a much stronger class of assumptions than computational assumptions. For example, deciding if a given integer has a modular square root or not may be much easier than actually computing a square root (or, equivalently, factoring the modulus). It is noteworthy that there are known ways to achieve CCA security that do not inherently rely on decisional assumptions (e.g., [9, 13, 23] ). In particular, the first practical encryption scheme CCA secure under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption was only recently proposed by Cash, Kiltz, and Shoup [13] and improved by Hanaoka and Kurosawa [23] . On the other hand, [9] provide a practical encryption scheme CCA secure under the Bilinear Computational Diffie-Hellman (BCDH) assumption.
Random oracle schemes. In a different line of research, Bellare and Rogaway [2, 3] presented practical schemes for which they give heuristic proofs of CCA security under standard computational hardness assumptions. Their proofs are in the so-called random oracle model [2] where a hash function is treated as an ideal random function. We stress that although a proof in the random oracle model has a certain value it is still only a heuristic security argument for any implementation of the scheme. In particular, there exist cryptographic schemes that are provably secure in the random oracle model yet that are insecure with any possible standard-model instantiation of the hash function [12] . Details of our construction. In 1979 Rabin [35] proposed an encryption scheme based on the "modular squaring" trapdoor permutation whose one-wayness is equivalent to the factoring assumption. A semantically secure variant was later proposed by Goldwasser and Micali [22] . Our construction is based on the latter scheme [22] in its more efficient variant by Blum and Goldwasser [6] (which uses the Blum-Blum-Shub pseudorandom generator [5] to obtain an efficient hard-core function with linear output length). The BlumGoldwasser scheme can easily be shown insecure against a CCA attack. Our main contribution consists of modifying the Blum-Goldwasser scheme such that it is provably CCA secure under the same hardness assumption yet it retains its high efficiency. Surprisingly, it is sufficient to add one additional group element to the ciphertexts that is then used for a consistency check in the decryption algorithm. For the consistency check itself, we also need to add two group elements to the public key.
Note that Paillier and Villar [32] (building on work of Williams [38] ) show that the CCA security of schemes which only include an RSA modulus in the public key cannot be proven (using a black-box reduction) equivalent to factoring. In particular, this applies to the Blum-Goldwasser scheme [6] from which we start, so we have to modify the scheme's public key (and not only the ciphertexts). And indeed, given our modifications, our scheme's CCA security is equivalent to the factoring problem.
Proof Details. At a more technical level, the additional group elements in the public key can be set up by a simulator such that it is possible to decrypt (without the knowledge of the scheme's secret key) all consistent ciphertexts, except the ciphertext that is used to challenge the adversary. This "all-but-one" simulation technique can be traced back at least to [30] , where it was used in the context of pseudorandom functions. 1 In the encryption context, "all-but-one" simulations have been used in identity-based encryption [8] and were already applied to several encryption schemes in [9, 10, 13, 24, 25] .
The main novelty is that our proof makes direct use of the fact that the underlying primitive is a trapdoor one-way permutation, rather than the DiffieHellman problem. Therefore, the scheme's consistency check can be directly implemented by the simulator without having access to some external gap-oracle (as in [9, 10, 25] ) or using other extrinsic rejection techniques (such as "hash proof systems" [15, 14] , "twinning" [13] , or authenticated symmetric encryption [28, 24] 2 ). Thus, our proof technique is fundamentally different from all known approaches 1 We stress that our use of the term "all-but-one" refers to the ability to generate a secret key that can be used to decrypt all consistent ciphertexts except for an externally given ciphertext. This is very different from the techniques of, e.g., [31, 16, 15] : in these latter frameworks, the first step in the proof consists in making the challenge ciphertext inconsistent, and then constructing a secret key that can be used to construct all consistent ciphertexts. Hence, "all-but-one" really refers to an "artificially punctured" secret key. 2 As opposed to generic CCA-secure symmetric encryption, a potentially weaker primitive.
to obtain CCA security. This also includes the recent class of schemes based on lossy trapdoor functions [33] .
Efficiency. The resulting encryption scheme (which is actually a key encapsulation mechanism, see [15] ) is very efficient: encryption needs roughly two, and decryption roughly one modular exponentiations; the public-key contains the modulus plus two group elements. (The modulus and one element can be viewed as systems parameters shared among all parties). To the best of our knowledge this is much more efficient than all known CCA-secure schemes based on an assumption related to factoring, even the ones based on a decisional assumption.
Preliminaries

Notation
We write [N ] = {1, . . . , N}. For group elements g, h, we denote by dlog g h the discrete logarithm of h to the base g, i.e., the smallest i ≥ 0 with h = g i . A probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm is a randomized algorithm which runs in strict polynomial time. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, we write y ← A(x) to denote that the random variable y is defined as the output of A when run on input x and with fresh random coins. On the other hand, if S is a set, then s ← S defines s as being uniformly and independently sampled from S. By k we denote the security parameter, which indicates the "amount of security" we desire. Typically, an adversarial advantage should be bounded by 2 −k , and a typical value for k is 80.
Factoring
A prime number P is called a safe prime iff P = 2p + 1 for a prime p. We assume a PPT algorithm IGen that, on input a security parameter k in unary, generates two random safe primes P = 2p+1 and Q = 2q +1 with bitlength(p) = bitlength(q) = N (k)/2 − 1. We assume that p and q are odd, such that P and Q are congruent 3 modulo 4 and N = P Q is a Blum integer. IGen returns N along with P and Q. Here N (k) denotes a function that represents, for any given security parameter k, the recommended (bit-)size of the composite modulus N . For the rest of the paper, we assume that N is generated by the factoring instance generator IGen.
is a cyclic group of order pq. Note that this implies that a uniformly chosen element of QR N is a generator (of QR N ) with overwhelming probability. Computations in QR N are computations modulo N . If it is implied by context, we omit writing explicitly "mod N " for calculations modulo N .
Definition 1 (Factoring assumption). For an algorithm F, we define its factoring advantage as
We say that F (t fac , fac )-factors composite integers if F runs in time t fac and Adv
The factoring assumption (with respect to IGen) states that Adv fac IGen,F (k) is negligible in k for every PPT F. The best algorithms currently known for factoring N = P Q of length N = bitlength(N ) = log N have (heuristic) running time
. Therefore, if we want k bits of security, we need to choose the function N (k) such that the above term is lower bounded by 2 k . As an example, one commonly uses N (80) = 1024.
Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
Instead of a public-key encryption scheme we consider the conceptually simpler KEM framework. It is well-known that an IND-CCA secure KEM combined with a (one-time-)IND-CCA secure symmetric cipher (DEM) yields a IND-CCA secure public-key encryption scheme [15] . Efficient one-time IND-CCA secure DEMs can be constructed even without computational assumptions by using an encryptthen-MAC paradigm [15] (or, alternatively, using computational assumptions such as strong pseudorandom permutations [34] ).
A key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) KEM = (Gen, Enc, Dec) consists of three PPT algorithms. Via (pk , sk ) ← Gen(1 k ), the key generation algorithm produces public/secret keys for security parameter k ∈ AE; via (K, C) ← Enc(pk ), the encapsulation algorithm creates a symmetric key 3 K ∈ {0, 1} K together with a ciphertext C; via K ← Dec(sk , C), the possessor of secret key sk decrypts ciphertext C to get back a key K which is an element in {0, 1}
K or a special reject symbol ⊥. For correctness, we require that for all possible k ∈ AE, and all
, where the probability is taken over the choice of (pk , sk ) ← Gen(1 k ), and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above.
The common requirement for a KEM is indistinguishability against chosenciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) [15] , where an adversary is allowed to adaptively query a decapsulation oracle with ciphertexts to obtain the corresponding key. We are using the slightly simpler but equivalent one-phase definition from [26] . and Exp
In the above experiments, the decryption oracle Dec(sk , ·), when queried with a ciphertext 
Target-Collision Resistant Hashing
Informally, we say that a function T : X → Y is a target-collision resistant (TCR) hash function (aka universal one-way hash function [31] ), if, given a random preimage x ∈ X, it is hard to find x = x with T(x ) = T(x). 
Definition 3 (TCR hash function). Let T : X → Y be a function. For an algorithm B, define
Adv TCR T,B (k) := Pr [x ← X, x ← B(x) : x = x ∧ T(x ) = T(x)] .
We say that B (t T , T )-breaks T's TCR property (short: B (t T , T )-breaks T) iff B's running time is at most t T (k) and Adv
Chosen-Ciphertext Security from Factoring
The Scheme
In this section, we will present our KEM construction. We will make use of two building blocks: a target collision-resistant hash function, and the Blum-BlumShub (BBS) pseudorandom number generator [5] .
Concretely, for a product N = P Q of two primes P, Q and u ∈ N , we establish the following notation: |u| denotes the absolute value of u and LSB N (u) = u mod 2 the least significant bit of u, where in both cases u is interpreted as a signed integer with
K denote the BBS generator applied to u and modulo N . Furthermore, for N as above, let T : N → {1, . . . , 2 T −1} be a target-collision resistant hash function.
The scheme. We are ready to define the following key encapsulation mechanism KEM = (Gen, Enc, Dec):
Gen then sets X = g α2 K + T and outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk , where
.
and outputs the key
holds, and rejects if not. If (1) holds, Dec computes a, b, c ∈ Z such that
Note that c < T since 0 < t < 2 T . Then, Dec derives
and from this K = BBS N (T ) ∈ {0, 1} K , which is the output. We remark that decapsulation (or, rather, generation of the secret keys) does not require knowledge about the factorization of N . Indeed, the modulus N as well as the generator g can be viewed as global system parameters shared by many parties. Then pk only contains the value X ∈ QR N and sk only contains α ∈ [(N − 1)/4].
Our scheme uses an RSA modulus N that consists of safe primes. In Section 5 we show how to avoid this assumption and allow N to be an arbitrary Blum integer.
Correctness. The correctness of the scheme might not be obvious, so we prove it here. Fix a public key pk and a secret key sk as produced by Gen(1 k ), and assume that (R, S) is a ciphertext for a key K as generated by Enc(pk ). We have to show that Dec (sk , (R, S) 
(where ( * ) uses R = g r2 K + T ), so (1) holds. Hence, (R, S) is not rejected by Dec. Now (1) implies
where the division in the exponent is computed modulo pq = |QR N |. (Note that while S may or may not be a quadratic residue, S 2 certainly is.) This gives
where, again, ( * ) The proof of Theorem 1 will be given in Section 4.
Efficiency. We claim that, with some trivial optimizations, encapsulation uses roughly two exponentiations, and decapsulation roughly one exponentiation. Namely, encapsulation can first compute A = g r and B = X r , which are two full exponentiations. Then, the remaining computations require only multiplications or exponentiations with very small exponents:
From D, (1) can be checked with D
= R 2t , which requires only two exponentiations with very small exponents. The key K can then be computed as
, which requires three exponentiations with small exponents (note that the bit-length of a and b is at most K + T ).
For concreteness let us assume that one regular exponentiation with an exponent of length requires 1.5 · modular multiplications and that one squaring takes the same time as one multiplication. Let us further assume that N := bitlength(N ) = 1024 and K = T = 80. Then encapsulation requires 3 N + K + 2.5 T = 3352 multiplications; decapsulation requires 1.5 N + 4 K + 6.5 T = 2376 multiplications. In Appendix A we also propose a variant of our scheme that has slightly more efficient decapsulation but suffers from a comparatively large public key size.
We remark that, by adding the prime factors P and Q to the secret-key, we can further improve the scheme's efficiency. For example, using Chinese Remaindering will speed up decapsulation by a factor between 3 and 4.
Proof of Security
We split up the proof of Theorem 1 into two parts:
-We first recall that the BBS generator is pseudorandom if factoring Blum integers is hard. This holds even if the modulus N and the 2 K -th power u 2 K of the BBS seed u are published, as is the case in our KEM. (Theorem 2.) -We then prove that KEM is IND-CCA secure under the assumption that the BBS generator is pseudorandom and the employed hash function is targetcollision resistant. This reduction is the heart of our proof. (Theorem 3.) Combining both parts yields Theorem 1.
We start by recalling that the BBS generator is pseudorandom, in the following sense.
Definition 4 (PRNG experiment for BBS generator). For an algorithm D, define
K is independently and uniformly chosen.
We say that D (t, )-breaks BBS if D's running time is at most t = t(k) and Adv
Concretely, any BBS-distinguisher can be used to factor Blum integers. ⇒ factoring algorithm [7,5,1,18] The following theorem contains the heart of our proof, namely, a simulation that shows that any successful IND-CCA adversary on KEM implies a successful BBS-distinguisher (and hence, using Theorem 2, can be used to factor Blum integers). 
Theorem 2 (BBS-distinguisher
Theorem 3 (IND-CCA adversary ⇒ BBS-distinguisher). For every adversary
Proof. Setting up the variables for simulation. Assume an adversary A on KEM's IND-CCA security. We define a BBS-distinguisher D, which acts on input (N, z, V ) as follows. D first uniformly selects a quadratic residue g ∈ QR N , as well as exponent β ∈ [(N − 1)/4], and sets
The public key used in the simulation is pk = (N, g, X) . It will be convenient to write
(Here and in the following, a division of exponents is computed modulo pq, the order of QR N .) Furthermore, in the following, we will silently assume that g generates QR N , which is very likely, but not guaranteed. A rigorous justification that takes into account error probabilities follows below.
Preparation of challenge ciphertext and key.
To complete the definition of the challenge ciphertext C * = (R * , S * ), write R * = g 2 K + T r * . Since we assumed that g is a generator, this is possible, but of course r * is unknown. D defines
as Enc would have computed. The (real) corresponding key K * is defined as
D then invokes A with public key pk = (N, g, X), challenge ciphertext C * = (R * , S * ), and challenge key V . Note that V is either the real challenge key BBS N (u), or it is a uniform string.
On the distribution of simulated public key and challenge ciphertext. We claim that the distribution of public key pk and challenge ciphertext C * is almost identical in simulation and IND-CCA experiment. Concretely, we postpone the straightforward but somewhat tedious proof of the following lemma until after the description of our simulation. 
We call a ciphertext consistent iff the original decryption algorithm would not have rejected it. Hence, by (1), a ciphertext is consistent iff
By our setup of variables, D can check (9) by itself, and hence detect and reject inconsistent ciphertexts.
How to decrypt consistent ciphertexts. Now assume that C is consistent and t = t * . Then, (4) and (5) follow (except for the deduction ( * )) just as in the correctness proof, and we get
for the raw key T that would have been computed by Dec. We will now show how D can compute T . Namely, D computes a , b , c ∈ Z such that
Since 1 ≤ t, t * < 2 T and t = t * , we have c < T . Similarly to (4) and (5), we obtain
from (9), and from this
= T. (13) Note that from T , the final decryption key can be computed as K = BBS N (T ). Hence, using (13), D can correctly decrypt every consistent ciphertext with t = t * .
The case t = t * . So let us turn to the case that t = t * and the ciphertext is consistent. Then, if R = R * holds, we have
where in ( * ) we use R = R * and t = t * . Furthermore, (R, S) = (R * , S * ) implies
= 0 mod N yields a non-trivial factorization of N . Hence, D can efficiently factor N to solve its own input challenge (N, z, L) directly whenever R = R * and (R, S) is consistent.
On the other hand, if T(R) = t = t * = T(R * ) and R = R * , then A has broken the target-collision resistance of T. Formally, let bad TCR denote the event that t = t * and R = R * . If bad TCR occurs, D can safely give up, since
for a suitable PPT adversary B on T that simulates D and A.
Summary of the decryption procedure. We summarize the decryption cases: -inconsistent (R, S) (consistency check (9)⇔(1) not passed): reject, -consistent (R, S) and t = t * : decrypt using (13), -consistent (R, S), t = t * , and R = R * : factor N (using S = ±S * and S 2 = S * 2 by (14)), -consistent (R, S), t = t * , and R = R * : give up simulation (A has found a T-collision). Hence, also decryption is faithfully simulated unless bad TCR occurs.
Finishing the proof. We conclude that, unless bad TCR or bad key occurs, D perfectly simulates the real IND-CCA experiment upon input V = BBS N (u), and the ideal IND-CCA experiment if V is random. If we let D output whatever the simulated experiment outputs, we obtain:
Using (8) and (15), Theorem 3 follows from (16) . It remains to prove Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. Observe that pk and C * are distributed slightly differently in the IND-CCA experiment (i.e., as generated by Gen and Enc) and in the simulation:
However, conditioned on the following event good key : (in the experiment:) g is a generator, and r * , α ≤ |QR N |, (in the simulation:) g is a generator, and β ≤ |QR N |, pk and C * are distributed identically in experiment and simulation: good key implies that N , g, X, and R * are uniformly and independently chosen over their respective domains, and S * follows deterministically from pk and R * according to (7) . Hence we only need to bound the probability of bad key := ¬good key . Since |QR N | = pq and we assumed that p and q are n/2-bit primes, a uniform QR N -element is a generator except with probability (p + q − 1)/pq ≤ 2 −n/2+2 . Furthermore, (N − 1)/4 is a close approximation of the group order |QR N | = pq = (N − 1)/4 − (p + q)/2, so that, e.g., r * ≤ |QR N | except with probability
both in the experiment and in the simulation.
Avoiding Safe Primes
In our KEM, we assume that N = P Q is composed of two safe primes (i.e., primes of the form P = 2p + 1 for prime p). We can drop this assumption and allow arbitrary Blum integers N , if we employ a Goldreich-Levin [21] based pseudorandom generator instead of the Blum-Blum-Shub generator. Namely, all we actually need to prove that KEM is IND-CCA is that
where
K are uniform, and Ext is a suitable randomness extractor. In our original description of KEM, we have Ext pk (u) = BBS N (u). In that case, we only know that the hardness of factoring N implies (17) if u = g r2 T is a uniform element of QR N (which is the case when N = P Q for safe primes P, Q, since then g is a generator with high probability). But if g is not a generator at least with high probability, then u may not be uniformly distributed.
Now suppose we set
for the Goldreich-Levin predicate GL s that maps u to the bitwise inner product of s and u. Then a hybrid argument and the hard-core property of GL s show that (17) is implied by the hardness of computing u with
But any algorithm B that computes such a u from (N, g, v) can be used to factor N . Namely, given N , choose uniformly h ∈ N andr ∈ [N/4], and set g = h 2 and v = g 2r+1 . (Observe that v is almost uniformly distributed over g , since N is a Blum integer.) Then, invoke B (N, g, v) to obtain a square root u of v. We can then compute a square root of g ash = u a g b (for a, b ∈ Z with a(2r + 1) + 2b = gcd(2r + 1, 2) = 1). With probability 1/2, then gcd(h −h, N ) yields a non-trivial factor of N . Hence (17) is implied by the hardness of factoring arbitrary Blum integers, and our KEM (instantiated with the Goldreich-Levin predicate) is IND-CCA secure. The price to pay is that we need to place a seed s ∈ {0, 1} N for the Goldreich-Levin hard-core function in the public key. (However, note that s can be made a global system parameter, like N and g.)
and rejects if not. Then, Dec computes t = (t 1 , . . . , t T ) = T(R) and checks
If (18) does not hold, Dec rejects. Otherwise, Dec computes
and
Correctness. The scheme enjoys correctness, since an honestly generated ciphertext (R, S) fulfils
so that consistency in the sense of (18) holds, and Dec (sk , (R, S)) outputs
Efficiency. With some trivial optimizations, KEM uses roughly two exponentiations for encapsulation and one for decapsulation. However, KEM 's public key contains 2 T + 1 group elements. This number can be roughly halved by using the following technique. Namely, observe that in KEM , the hash value t = T(R) is interpreted as a bitwise selector of T out of 2 T group elements X i,j . Instead, one can interpret t as an integer that specifies a subset of group elements X i . Concretely, we can define a mapping f from {0, 1} T to subsets of [ ], where denotes the number of group elements. For our proof, we will only need that for any distinct t, t * ∈ {0, 1} T , we have f (t) ⊆ f (t * ) and f (t * ) ⊆ f (t). As an example, we can have the injective mapping f that associates to t the t-th subset of [ ] of size /2. Using a suitable enumeration of these subsets, f can be implemented efficiently, and we will only need about ≈ T + log T group elements X i to make f injective. More sophisticated examples of such mappings f were suggested in the context of one-time signatures, see [37] . However, since our scheme KEM is far superior in public key size and (roughly) on par with KEM in terms of efficiency, we omit the details.
For concreteness let us again assume that one regular exponentiation with an exponent of length requires 1.5 · modular multiplications and that one squaring takes the same time as one multiplication. Let us further assume that N := bitlength(N ) = 1024 and K = T = 80. Then encapsulation requires 3 N + K + T = 3232 multiplications; decapsulation requires 1.5 N + K = 1616 multiplications. Hence in terms of efficiency KEM is slightly better than KEM, in particular for decapsulation. However, KEM has the drawback of large public key size. Given Theorem 2, it suffices to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5 (IND-CCA adversary on KEM ⇒ BBS-distinguisher). For every adversary
Proof. Setting up the variables for simulation. Assume an adversary A on KEM 's IND-CCA security. We define a BBS-distinguisher D, which acts on input (N, z, V ) as follows. D first uniformly picks an element h ∈ QR N , exponents
, and sets
Preparation of challenge ciphertext and key.
To complete the definition of the challenge ciphertext C * = (R * , S * ), D defines
such that (18) is met. Note that the (real) corresponding key K * according to Dec is defined as
D then invokes A with public key pk = (N, g, (X i,j ) i,j ), challenge ciphertext C * = (R * , S * ), and challenge key V . Note that V is either the real challenge key BBS N (u), or it is a uniform string.
On the distribution of simulated public key and challenge ciphertext. The distribution of public key pk and challenge ciphertext C * is almost identical in simulation and IND-CCA experiment. Concretely, the proof of the following lemma is very similar to the proof of Theorem 1, and we omit it. 
Our goal will be to implement a consistency check using our setup of variables above, and to decrypt consistent ciphertexts as in the IND-CCA experiment.
How to detect inconsistent ciphertexts. We first describe how D detects inconsistent ciphertexts. Namely, (22) is equivalent to
since exponentiating with 2 K +1 L is a bijection on QR N , 5 and the group elements on both sides of (22) are squares. On the other hand, D can easily check (23) and hence efficiently detect and reject inconsistent ciphertexts.
How to decrypt consistent ciphertexts. Now assume that C is consistent and t = t * (so that 1 ≤ d ≤ T ). Then,
5 At this point we need that the modulus N consists of the product of two safe primes such that QR N is a cyclic group whose order does not divide the integers 1, . . . , T . Hence for KEM it does not seem to be possible to avoid safe primes. (In contrast to KEM, cf. Section 5.)
